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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following are the issues presented for review by plaintiffs 
appeal: 
1. Whether a facially valid foreign judgment can be attacked 
in this state on grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency 
of service of process. 
2. Whether knowledge of pending litigation, outside of actual 
or constructive notice, is sufficient to impart the court's In personam 
jurisdiction. 
3. Whether the testimony of an Interested witness can be 
arbitrarily rejected by a trier of fact. 
4. Whether appellantfs attempted service of process fell within 
the legal bounds of "due process." 
5. Whether the process server's Return of Service was 
fraudulent, and if so, can such a return be impeached. 
6. Whether the motive of a defendant changing abodes bears any 
relevance to the Issue of service of process. 
7. Whether a defendant's intention to return or not to return 
to his abode is a determining factor as to what constitutes his "usual 
place of abode". 
8. Whether appellant complied with statutory requirements 
regulating abode service; specifically, was the house where service was 
attempted the "usual house of abode" of respondents. 
9. Whether the burden of proof rests with the appellant or with 
the respondent In a case on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES 
The United States Full Faith & Credit Clause is the only 
constitutional provision cited below that has a bearing on this case 
of which this respondent is aware of. 
The pertinent statute on which this case rests is a Washington 
statute regulating service of process, statute 4.28.080(14) of the 
Revised Code of Washington: 
4.28.060. Summons, how served 
The sumons shall be servced by delivering a copy 
thereof, as follows: 
(14) In all other cases, to the defendant personally, or 
by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his 
usual abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then resident therein. 
*Appellant in his brief has mistakenly recorded this statute as 
being under subsection (13); it is correctly subsection (14). 
STATEMENT OF THE. CASE 
1. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in 
District Court, 
This is an action by a Washington Corporation, the Corporation 
of the Tridentine Latin Rite Cathalic Church of St. Joseph, to 
register a Washington default judgment according to the Utah Foreign 
Judgment Act. Respondents motioned to vacate judgment pursuant to a 
provision in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, allowing a judgment to be 
vacated on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of 
service of process. Following an evidentiary hearing on May 16, 1988, 
the District Court ruled that service of process was not validly 
effected against respondents Bishop Francis K. Maria Schuckardt, Fra. 
Mary Fidelis, Fra, Phillip Marie, Fra. Clement Marie and Bro. John 
Francis Marie, and therefore entered a ruling quashing the Washington 
judgment against these individuals. Appellant appeals from this 
ruling which brings this case to the present court. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
In the early 1960fs the Catholic Church went through a number 
of radical changes In its liturgy and In its doctrines. Respondent, 
the Most Reverend Bishop Francis K. Schuckardt, being convinced that 
such changes were heretical, founded a traditional religious community 
in 1965 which adhered to the traditional doctrines and liturgy of the 
Catholic Church. (Tr. 9). In 1971, Bishop Schuckardt received his 
consecration to the office of Bishop and founded the Ecclesiastical 
Province of Our Lady of Guadalupe Trldentine Church. He used the 
appellation of Trldentine Latin Rite Catholic Church ("the Church") to 
distinguish it from the modern Catholic Church. (Tr. 9). In his role 
as founder and Bishop, he was the superior and highest authority in the 
Church. (Tr. 13). This authority extended to all matters relating to-
the Church, including the formation of corporations to hold property on 
behalf of the Church as well as appointing directors and trustees to 
manage such corporations in a respresentative capacity to himself. (Tr. 
12, 13, 15, 16, 18). Appellant corporation, Trldentine Latin Rite 
Catholic church of St. Joseph ("the Corporation"), was one such 
corporation founded by the Bishop, and Its sole, Rev. Chicolne, was 
likewise appointed to that position by the Bishop. (Tr. 12). Both were 
subject to the Bishop according to Church law and as outlined in the 
Articles of incorporation. (Tr. 12, 13). At the time of the takeover 
(see below) Chicoine amended the Articles of Incorporation, without any 
authority whatsoever, solely to the benefit of himself and his 
treacherous actions against the Bishop and Church. (Tr. 14). 
Up until June 3, 1984, Bishop Schuckardt and respondents Fra. 
Mary Fidelis, & Bro. John Francis Marie had all been residents of the 
Bishop's house for approximately three to four years. (Tr. 15-19, 53). 
Such house was known as the l,Priory,,. (Tr. 15, 16). 
On the night of June 2, 1984, Bishop Schuckardt and other 
respondents became aware of Chicoine's contumelious efforts in taking 
control of the Church (Tr. 31), and on the following day, greatly 
fearing for his physical safety and following sound advice, (Tr. 31-
2), Bishop Schuckardt, accompanied by respondents Fra. Mary Fidelis, 
Bro. John Francis Marie, and Fra. Mary Matthias, left the Priory and 
moved to the Jefferson House Motel in Spokane. (Tr. 32, 33, 41-2, 55, 
82-3, 117, 132, 157, 165, 188, 190-1). None of the above respondents 
had any intention of ever returning to the Priory, and indeed, never 
did, with the exception of Bro. John Francis Marie and Fra. Mary 
Fidelis returning for a short period of time to complete their packing 
on June 4th. (Tr. 33, 36-7, 56, 117, 157, 166-7). Such intent is 
verified by the fact that on June 3rd, faithful Church members 
remained at the Priory after respondents' departure to pack and 
transport their belongings from the Priory, (Tr. 36-7, 54-5, 77, 84, 
107, 118, 132, 151-2, 166), and by the fact that a place to stay in 
California was offered and accepted on June 5th. (Tr. 37-9, 77, 124, 
132, 153, 157, 167). All of the above was done prior to any purported 
attempted service of process which took place on June 8th. (Tr. 94-
106) . 
In the process of packing and moving property from the Priory, 
A 
faithful Church members were being continually subjected to harassment 
and intimidation by the rebellious members of appellant's church. 
Such harassment included the stealing of a Church van loaded with 
Church property in an violent and unlawful manner and other tactics of 
intimidation and provocation all with the design of forcing out and 
keeping out of the Priory all Church members who refused join 
allegiance to the abortive Chicoine faction. (Tr. 24, 32-36, 56, 84-
5, 90-1, 101, 113, 128, 181). 
On June 7th, appellant filed a complaint in the County of 
Spokane, against respondents for allegedly, among other things, 
converting to themselves property of appellant Corporation. Summons 
were issued on the same day. (See Exhibit "A"). 
On June 8th, Sheriff's Department employee, Deputy Ellis, 
accompanied by another officer and two members of the Chicoine faction 
(Pivaronus and Drahman) came to the Priory to purportedly attempt 
service of proces. (Tr. 96,97). Contrary to the report in the 
Deputy's Return of Service, he made no attempt to diligently search or 
inquire as to any of the defendants in the Washington action. (Tr. 
102-3, Exhibit "B"). As Deputy Ellis moved up the Priory driveway 
towards the house Pivaronus purportedly pointed out to him Fra. Mary 
Matthias from among several Religioius Brothers within a close 
proximity of him. (Tr. 82, 97-8, 101, 180-1, 188-9). Deputy Ellis did 
not verify if such person was indeed Fra. Mary Matthias nor was he able 
to either to describe or identify him. (Tr. 106). Due to the fear of 
violence, Deputy Ellis had found that the Church members all retreated 
into the house, (Tr. 81, 179), but upon knocking the door was opened, 
(Tr. 81-2, 97-8, 180-1, 188-9). When the Deputy responded in the 
negative to the question whether he possessed a search warrant he put 
his foot in the path of the closing door and threw some papers onto the 
ground. (Tr. 78-82, 98-100, 119-24). He thereupon left. (Tr. 101). 
Respondents were never advised by anyone that a summons and 
complaint were ever served upon them nor did they have any knowledge of 
the lawsuit outside of sporadic and conflicting rumors. (Tr. 40, 57, 
58, 59, 61). 
Respondents forthwith left Washington without ever receiving 
notice that a civil suit had been filed against them. (Tr. 40, 57, 58, 
59, 61). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
1. Acceding to appellant, that Washington law is controlling 
as to the validity of service of process, respondent takes issue that 
service can be attacked only according to Washington law. Appellant 
filed this suit as a foriegn judgment, and as such, it is subject to 
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, which makes clear provisions for 
attacking foreign judgments for lack of jurisdiction or for being 
void. 
2. The allegation that respondents had knowledge of the suit is 
erroneous and irrelevant. Even if such knowledge existed, it would not 
have been sufficient to impart jurisdiction, for a court's jurisdiction 
can be obtained only through actual or constructive notice. 
3. The credibility of a witness, even though such witness has 
an interest in the outcome of the case, cannot be arbitrarily rejected 
in the absence of evidence either establishing facts contrary to his 
testimony or good cause arising to cast doubt upon his veracity. 
Herein no cause was established to doubt the truthfulness of the 
witnesses or the truthfulness of their testimony, in the absence of 
which their testimony must stand. 
4. The due process laws of this country require a plaintiff to 
attempt means to actually notify a defendent of a pending legal action, 
as outlined by the United States Supreme Court. Appellant in this 
action purposefully intended not to inform respondents of the 
Washington suit, and indeed, did not inform them, thus placing their 
attempted service charade outside the pale of the law of due process. 
Such actions cannot, as a matter of law, confer jurisdiction. 
5. The return of the process server in this action contains 
fraud, and is therefore subject to impeachment. 
6. Appellant's allegation that repondents moved to avoid 
creditors is both untrue and irrelevant to the case at bar. It is a 
non-issue. 
7. An important factor in determining one's usual place of 
abode during one's absence, is the party's intention to return or not 
to return. Such intention has been held to be the determining factor 
in the absence of evidence showing otherwise. Here such uncontroverted 
intention has been produced, and should be conclusive upon the courts. 
8. Abode service upon respondents' home after they had moved 
out with the intention of never returning and after they had already 
acquired another place to live, does not fall within the meaning of the 
Washington statute providing substitute service at the "usual place of 
abode," rather, such place had become respondents' "former place of 
abode," thereby rendering such attempted service invalid. 
9. The burden of proof falls upon the appellant in this case, 
to prove that the lower court so erred as to compel this court to 
reverse. All the facts in this case rather support the verdict of the 
lower court, and appellant has not sustained his burden of proof. 
FIRST, ARGUMENT 
While Washington law is controlling as to what 
constitutes valid service of process, Utah law is 
controlling as to whether or not such service is 
subject to attack in Utah. 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78~22a-2, subsection 
(2), provides that: 
The clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign 
judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district 
court of Utah. A judgment filed under this chapter has 
the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, 
defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, 
setting aside, or staying, as a judgment of a district 
court of this state and is subject to enforcement and 
satisfaction in like manner. 
Utah provides for the quashing of service of summons even after 
a final judgment. Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) 
states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has 
not been personally served upon defendant as required 
by Rule; 
(5) the judgment is void; 
Such law is well within the keeping of the U.S. Constitutional 
requirement known as the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In Pennoyer v. 
Neff (1877) 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565, the court said the following 
regarding the Full Faith and Credit Act: 
iTlhe Act lis] applicable only when the court rendering 
the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and o£ the 
subject-matter, and not to preclude an inquiry into the 
jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment was 
rendered. 
Neither has Utah been silent on this subject. In Data 
Management Systems v, EDP Corporation (Utah 1985), 709 P.2d 337,the 
court spoke very clearly on this issue: 
A 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a 
judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign 
judgment on the ground of fraud or the want of 
jurisdiction or due process of law, Hobelman Motors, 
Inc. v. Allred, Utah, 685 P.2d 544 (1984); Van Kleeck 
Creamery, Inc., v. Western Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 
2d 63, 465 P.2d. 544 (1970). A foreign judgment 
rendered without jurisdiction over the defendant or 
under circumstances which amount to lack of due process 
Is not entitled to full faith and credit in Utah. 
Appellant in his brief argues that respondents waived any 
right they had to attack the validity of service of process by failing 
to raise this issue in Washington. In making such a contention, 
appellant makes this enormous, although erroneous, leap from the fact 
that Washington law is determinative of whether the "service of the 
summons and complaint was lawfully effected" to Imposing Washington 
Rules of Court upon Utah. The only laws of Washington which are 
binding upon Utah, are those which Utah binds upon herself. In this 
case, Utah expressly provides, by statute, its own law for attacking 
the lack of jurisdiction and Insufficiency of process of a foreign 
judment. Furthermore, appellant is not correct in his interpretation 
of Washington law. While Washington Rules of Court [C.R. 8 & C.R. 
12(b)(5)] do state that the defense of lack of jurisdiction and 
insufficiency of process must be raised by motion or responsive 
pleading, this rule is subservient to C.R. 60 (b), which states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: 
(5) The judgment is void; 
(11) Any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Expounding upon this rule, Washington Practice, section 5713, 
under the title of Void Judgments, states: 
The general doctrine is that a void judgment can be 
attacked at any time. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Gooley (1938) 196 Wash. 357, 83 P.2d 221; King 
County v. Rea (1944) 21 Wash.2d 593, 152 P.2d 310. A 
void judgment is a legal nullity; it cannot become 
valid through the laches of the judgment debtor, 
Lushington v. Seattle Auto & Driving Club (1910) 60 
Wash. 546, 111 P. 785. 
Most erroneous judgments are valid until set aside or 
vacated. However, the judgment is void if the 
rendering court lacked jurisdiction over the parties, 
or over the subject matter, or if due process 
requirements were not fulilled. Bass v. Hoagland 
(C.A.Sth, 1949) 172 F.2d 205; Jones v. Watts 
(CCA.5th, 1944) 142 F.2d 575; Ruddles v. Auburn Spark 
Plug Co. (D.CN.Y. 1966) 261 F.Supp. 648,, 
Washington case law also backs up the holding that a judgment 
void for lack of jurisdiction is assailable at any time, Staley v. 
Staley (1976) 15 Wash.App. 254, 164 P.2d 1097; as well as holding that 
a void judgment can be attacked at any time, Metropolitan Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n of Seattle v. Greenacres Memorial Ass'n (1972) 7 Wash.App. 
695, 502 P.2d 476. 
Finally, appellant relies upon Raymond v. Flemming, 24 
Wash.App. 112, 600 P.2d 614, to support his fallacious argument that 
respondents waived their right to challenge service pursuant to C.R. 8 
& C R . 12(b)(5). Such contention is drawn from a misunderstanding of 
the Raymond case. Raymond states: "The defense of insufficient 
service of process must be affirmatively pleaded in the answer 
pursuant to CR 8 or included in a motion made pursuant to CR 12(b)(5), 
CR 12(h); Matthies v. Knodel, 19 Wash.App. 1, 573 P.2d 1332 (1977); 3A 
L. Orland, Wash.Prac. 24 (1968)." Upon considering the facts of this 
case, it can be clearly seen how defendents Flemming and Wilson fell 
subject to C R . 8 & C R . 12(b)(5). Flemming and Wilson were 
Canadian citizens involved in an automobile accident. Pursuant to 
RCWA 46.64.040, Raymond attempted service upon the Secretary of 
State. Flemming's insurance carrier referred the case to a 
Bellingham, Wa. attorney who filed a notice of appearance. 
Thereafter, Raymond's counsel "repeatedly asked for an answer to the 
complaint, which requests were not acceded to, and defense counsel 
just as repeatedly asked Raymond's counsel for additional time to file 
an answer, which requests were acceded to." This scenario continued 
through a motion for default or in the alternative for a trial 
assignment and through an order compelling answers to Interrogatories. 
After all this, a firm of Seattle attorneys substituted in on 
Flemmlng's behalf and moved for an order of dismissal for lack of 
proper service. Their motion was denied, as defendants had waived 
their right to challenge service. 
As can be readily seen, the facts in this case draw no parallel 
to the case at bar. Here respondents never filed a notice of 
appearance, nor did they have an attorney representing them, nor did 
they have communication with the court or appellant's attorney at any 
time. Unlike the Raymond case, respondents were never under the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
Therefore it is clear, that the district court was well within 
its rights to hear respondents' motion to quash service. 
SECOND ARQUMBNT 
Actual or constructive notice is necessary to invoke 
the court's in personam jurisdiction. Knowledge 
outside of such notice does not confer jurisdiction. 
Appellant alleges that respondents knew from "rumors of a 
complaint" and that by a decree of excommunication (See Appellant's 
Exhibit P-4) for "summoning his own Ordinary (respondent Bishop 
Schuckardt) before a lay tribunal", that such notice was sufficient to 
confer the court's jurisdiction over them. Such is not the case. 
Respondent here agrees with appellant that Washington law is 
controlling. Washington Rules of Court - C.R. 4(d)(5) state: 
A voluntary appearance of a defendant does not preclude 
his right to challenge lack of jurisdiction over his 
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of 
service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b). 
Now if a defendant is not precluded from challenging service after a 
voluntary appearance, which would indicate certain knowledge of a suit, 
certainly he would not be precluded from challenging service if his 
knowledge was uncertain and based upon rumors, as is the case at bar, 
(Tr. 40, 57, 58, 59, 61), Following along in this strain, the courts 
have not been silent. In City of Spokane v, Dept. of Labor & Indus. 
663 P.2d 843 (Wash.App.1983) the court said: "The mere fact that a 
respondent in a lawsuit or his counsel may acquire a copy of the 
process does not necessarily constitute service. See Adkinson v. 
Digby, Inc., 99 Wash.2d 206, 209-10, 660 P.2d 756 (1983); CR 4(d)(5); 
CR 12(b).M And going even further, the Supreme Court of Washington 
ruled: "Until notice, actual or constructive, is given to a defendant, 
the court has no jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judgment.M 
Ashley v. Superior Court (1974) 83 Wash.2d 630, 521 P.2d 771. And 
finally in the landmark case of Interior Warehouse Co. v. Hays, 158 P. 
99, the Washington Supreme Court said: "Jurisdiction of the Interior 
Warehouse Company could only be obtained by service of proper process 
upon it. The fact that it had knowledge of the pendency of the action 
did not give the court jurisdiction to render judgment that would be 
binding upon it. Osborne & Co. v. Columbia etc., Corporation, 9 Wash. 
666, 38 P. 160; Bennett v. Supreme Tent, etc., Maccabees, 40 Wash. 431, 
82 P. 744, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 389." 
Therefore respondents1 second-hand information regarding the 
possibility of a Washington suit was not sufficient to subject them to 
the jurisdiction of the court. 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
Where an interested witness gives testimony which, if 
accepted, is controlling of the issues in a case, and 
there are no other facts or circumstances in the case 
directly contradicting the witness, and he is not 
otherwise directly impeached, his testimony must be 
accepted. 
This fact is well settled. It is said "that where the 
testimony of an unimpeached witness is uncontradicted and its 
credibility not reflected upon in any way, it must be accepted, or at 
least that the trial court is justified in accepting it and directing a 
verdict based thereon, and in a substantial number of cases it has been 
so held even though the witness was shown to be interested in the 
result and so had some motive to falisfy." 62 ALR2d 1191. Along this 
strain it has been further said that where the positive testimony of a 
witness is uncontradicted and unimpeached, either by positive testimony 
or by circumstantial evidence, either extrinsic or Intrinsic, jjb cannot 
be disregarded, but must control the decision of the court or jury. 
Anderson v. Liljengren, 50 Minn. 3, 52 NW 219; Lomer v. Meeker 25 NY 
361. (Emphasis supplied) This holds for cases where the witnesses 
have been deemed "interested witnesses"; Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. 
Martin (1931) 283 US 209, 75 L.ed. 983, 51 S.Ct. 453; Kelly v. Jones 
(1919) 290 111 375, 125 NE 334, 8 ALR 792; Pioneer Trust Co. v. Combs 
(1924) 117 Kan 89, 230 P. 302; Second Nat. Bank v. Donald (1894) 56 
Minn. 491, 58 NW 269; Goedhard v. Folstad (1923) 156 Minn. 453, 195 NW 
281; Sullivan v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (1939) 109 Mont. 93, 94 P.2d 651; 
Geschwind v. Brorsen, (1953, Okla.) 258 P.2d 619; Re Miller's Will 
(1907) 49 Or. 452, 90 P. 1002; Citizens1 Trust & Saving Bank v. 
Stackhouse (1912) 91 SC 455, 74 SE 977, 40 LRA NS 454. 
Furthermore, the veracity of such testimony must be held as true 
especially "where it appeared that the testimony related to a matter as 
to which the opposing party could have produced contradictory 
testimony, if the facts were not as stated by the witness, or where the 
testimony given was clearly consistent with all the other circumstances 
of the case." 62 ALR2d 1191, 1201. Such were the circumstances of 
this case. All parties were present at a full scale hearing, and there 
was nothing presented which in the least contradicted the testimony of 
respondents, and consequently the court correctly followed this rule by 
accepting as true respondents' testimony. 
And finally it must be said that the trier of fact in this 
case should not be contradicted as to the veracity of the testimony 
given, for as the court in Kelly v. Jones (1919) 290 111. 375, 125 NE 
334, said: "much weight is to be given to the findings of the 
chancellor who saw and heard the witness, since his credibility may be 
seriously affected by his appearance, manner, and conduct while 
testifying." 62 ALR2d 1191, 1202. 
In conclusion therefore, in the absence of any evidence 
discrediting the testimony of respondents in thLs case, the district 
court ruled correctly in accepting such testimony as factual. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
Due process requires the Intention of actually 
informing someone of a legal proceeding. Process which 
is just a mere gesture is not due process, and 
consequently cannot confer jurisdiction. 
Appellant's actions in attempting service of process in this 
action clearly demonstrate there was never any actual attempt to notify 
respondents of the pending legal action, but was a mere gesture to 
"fulfill" the legal requirements of Washington law. 
In 28 Fed. Proc, L.ed, section 65:58, the text comments on the 
constitutional requirements of service of process as outlined in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 94 
L.ed 865, 70 S.Ct, 199: 
"Due process requires that notice be reasonably 
calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of an action and to 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 
The notice must be of such a nature as to convey the 
required Information and must afford a reasonable time 
for interested parties to make their appearance. 
Process which Is a^  mere gesture Is not due process, and 
the means employed In serving process must be such as 
one desirous of actually Informing the absentee might 
reasonably adopt to accomplish this purpose. (Emphasis 
supplled) 
What must be determined by this court, is whether or not 
appellant actually tried to notify respondents of the pending 
litigation. The facts below clearly demonstrate that they did not. 
The process server, Deputy Ellis, on his return of service 
stated: "SUBSTITUTE: After diligent search and inquiry, was unable to 
find (name of respondent attempted substitute service was tried on), I 
served by delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath (Fra. Mary 
Matthias) . . .M (See Exhibit "B"). 
The fact is that he made no diligent search or Inquiry as 
certified by his return of service, as the transcript below clearly 
shows: 
Tr. p. 102: 
Q. What did you do to diligently search & inquire about 
the whereabouts of the other (respondents who sub. 
service was attempted on) defendants? 
Q. I think my question is what did you do? 
A. To go to the residence and that was all. 
Q. Did you attempt in any way to find out who actually 
resided or lived at that location? 
A. I did not, no. 
Q. The returns of service were made pursuant to your 
direction as to what you had done, were they not? 
-i c; 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you received the papers approximately what time 
during the day? 
A* I don't know, that day, that afternoon probably ... 
I went to Cavanaugh's Interpark, before the Priory, to 
look for Fra. Mary Matthias or Bishop Schuckardt. 
p. 104 -
Q. Did you make any other attempt to locate any other 
defendant other than to just go to the Altamont 
residence (Priory)? 
A. No. 
p. 105 -
Q. Did you have any knowledge of your own as to whether 
any of the defendants named actually lived at the 
Priory? 
A. No. 
Q. What did you rely on? 
A. The people that sent the papers to our office. 
Q. The plaintiffs themselves? 
A. They supplied us with an address, and with that 
Information they gave to us and we go with the 
information that Is given. 
p. 106 -
Q. Did you make any attempt to verify whether any of 
them lived at that address? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any defendant other than Terry Horwath, 
a Fra. Matthias, the same Individual here, did you see 
any other people there that you could identify as a 
defendant In this action? 
A. No. 
Q. Was anyone else pointed out to you as being a 
defendant in this action? 
A. He was the only one pointed out. 
Q. Can you describe Terry Horwath? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he identify himself to you as being Terry 
Horwath or Fra. Matthias? 
A. I don't believe so, no. 
It is clear from the foregoing that Deputy Ellis made no 
attempt whatsoever to discover the whereabouts of respondents Fra. Mary 
Fidelis and Bro. John Francis Marie, and only a cursory and superficial 
attempt to locate respondent Bishop Francis K. Schuckardt. Such 
action falls short of the standard set in Mullame (supra) and cannot 
confer jurisdiction of the Washington court over respondents. 
In addition to the Deputy's superficially attempted service, 
Washington plaintiff Thomas Drahman knowingly supplied Deputy Ellis 
i a 
with false information. The transcript below clearly shows that 
Drahman had knowledge of the Bishop's departure but nevertheless had 
Deputy Ellis attempt service at the Priory: 
Tr. p. 190 -
Q. At the time you were there with the Sheriff to serve 
the summons on the 8th, did you know whether the Bishop 
was still resident at that address or not? 
A. (Drahman) I have no idea sir. 
Q. Do you know whether your attorney had any idea 
who was your attorney in Spokane? 
A. Mr. Bruce Erickson. He told me earlier that he — I 
guess that he felt the Bishop had already moved out, 
but was not sure. 
Q. So you didn't have any knowledge whether the Bishop 
did or did not live at the Priory at that time did you? 
A. All we knew was that was his residence, so we went 
there to serve him at the Priory. 
p. 191 -
Q But your attorney believed that he may have moved 
out? 
A. Yes, but he had no knowledge of this. 
Q. When did he tell you where he thought he had moved 
to? 
A. I believe it was sometime -- and it could have been 
a week, it could have been three days. I am not sure, 
that he thought the Bishop had moved to a hotel on 
South Hill. He had information that the Bishop had 
left that area also. 
Q. Was any attempt made to serve the Bishop at whatever 
current address he was currently living at, if you 
know? 
A. No, because we were told that he had left there, 
that hotel. 
Clearly, plaintiff Drahman, who accompanied Deputy Ellis, knew 
that the Bishop had already left the Priory, but had substitute service 
attempted upon him in total disregard to Title 4.28.080(14) of 
the Washington codes, which states: 
Summons, how served 
The summons shall be served by delivering a copy 
thereof, as follows: 
(14) In all other cases, to the defendant personally, 
or by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his 
usual abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then resident therein. 
Such attempted service clearly is lacking the intention of 
giving a party actual notice as required by law. 
FIFTH ARGUMENT 
The return of the process server was fraudulent and can 
be impeached as a matter of law. 
The return of the process server was fraudulent as to all 
respondents, and therefore is subject to Impeachment. The process 
server, Deputy Ellis, on his return of service stated: "SUBSTITUTE: 
After diligent search and inquiry, was unabLe to find (name of 
respondent attempted substitute service was tried on), I served by 
delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath (Fra. Mary Matthias) . . ." 
(See Exhibit "B"). 
The fraud in this return is that he made no diligent search or 
inquiry as has been evidenced in the Fourth Argument. 
It is clear from the foregoing, that Deputy Ellis certified a 
false return a service to the jeopordy of the respondents. 
In John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, (Wash.) 83 P.2d 
221, the Supreme Court held: "While a return of service of process 
stands as prima facie correct, it is subject to attack, and may be 
discredited by competent evidence." Also following in this strain is 
Wilson v. Upton, Okla. 373 P.2d 229; Phoenix Airport Travelodge v. 
Dolgin, Az., 470 P.2d 506; to name a few. Here the Deputy discredited 
his own return under oath, thereby subjecting the return to 
impeachment. 
While it is certain that service, not the return, confers 
jurisdiction, in the case of a default judgment, where defendants made 
no appearance, the jurisdiction and power of the court to render the 
judgment rested solely and entirely upon the false return. I contend 
that without the "diligent search and inquiry" falsehood contained in 
the return, the court would have ruled the return utterly insufficient 
to establish that jurisdiction was conferred. 
Although law relating to false returns of service is scanty, 
the subject has been addressed. In Rose v. Northwest F. & M. Ins. Co, 
(1895, CC Or.) 67 F. 439, the court held that a judgment of a sister 
state is subject to attack, in an action based thereon, on the ground 
that it was obtained by the fraud of the judgment plaintiff and of an 
officer who caused the record to show a false return of service. Also 
In Anthony v. Masters (1902) 28 Ind.App. 239, 62 NE 505, held that a 
judgment of a sister state (Florida) obtained through the fraud of the 
judgment plaintiffs and the officer who made a false return of service 
of process was held to be subject to attack on the ground of fraud. The 
court pointed out that the fraud constituted a good ground for 
equitable relief against the enforcement of the judgment, and that the 
fraud was one going to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the 
judgment. It said: "We are inclined to the opinion that our courts 
should regard any unconscionable judgment of a sister state procured by 
fraud as open to impeachment under pleadings based upon equitable 
principles in such state." 
Thus, this court should uphold the quashing of service of the 
district court due to the fraud contained In Deputy Ellis1 Return of 
Service. 
SIXTH ARGUMENT 
The motive of a party changing abodes, as concerning 
service of summons, Is Irrelevant. 
On pages 13 - 14 of appellant's brief, appellant claims that 
respondants motive for leaving the Priory was, as in Ridpath, to 
defraud creditors. This argument is unsound for three reasons. 
Firstly, respondents had clearly left the Priory four (4) days 
prior to the filing of the complaint in this action (see Exhibit MAH) 
and five (5) days prior to attempted service upon them (see Exhibit 
"B") . 
Secondly, there is no evidence corroborating such an 
allegation, most certainly their quoting Tr . 55 & 56 does not sustain 
their contention, but rather says that respondants left because they 
feared for their safety, not that they left to defraud their creditors. 
Thirdly, the real issue here is that motive i_s not an issue, 
nor does it bear any relevance to service. 
In Hyslop v. Hoppock (1872, DC NY) F cas No 6988, it was held 
that an established home from which defendants had fled to Canada 
allegedly to avoid jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was not in 
fact defendants' dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes 
of service of process, the court stated that the circumstances of 
defendants' departure were not relevant to the issue. 
In Graig v. Gisborne (1859), 79 Mass (13 Gray) 270, where an 
officer's return recited that he had not been able to find defendant 
or any last or usual place of abode »jf his, except on board a steamer 
bound for Europe, where he had taken passage and was hidden, the 
court, in finding that service by leaving a copy of the process at 
defendant's berth on the steamer was invalid, stated that the fact 
that defendant was hidden In the steamer was no reason for 
substituting for personal service the leaving of a copy where he might 
find it. Similar rulings were made in Berner v. Farny (1951, DC NJ) 
11 FRD 506 and in Sweeney v. Miner (1915) 88 NJL 361, 95 A. 1014. 
Therefore, appellant's contention that respondents fled to 
avoid creditors is not only false, but is of no consequence. 
SEVENTH ARGUMENT 
One's intention to return or not to return to one's 
abode is a determining factor in establishing one's 
"usual place o£ abode." 
It is well settled that during one's absence from his home, his 
intention to either return or pot to return is a determining factor as 
to whether such home constitutes his "present" or his "last" place of 
abode. In Du Val v. Johnson (1882) 39 Ark 182, it was stated that 
service at defendant's residence in Arkansas in 1856 was effective 
notwithstanding defendant had left for California in 1854 and did not 
return until 1857, on the ground that defendant did not leave with an 
intention of changing his.residence. In McGlll v. Miller (1931) 183 
Ark 585, 37 SW2d 689, the court said that one's usual place of abode 
was the place to which one had - whenever he was absent - the Intention 
of returning. Another Arkansas case, Shephard v. Hopson (1935) 191 Ark 
284, 86 SW2d 30, stated that a change of place of abode was 
accomplished when a person removed from one place with the intention of 
abandoning such place of abode and established a residence in another 
locality where he expected to abide, without the intention of returning 
to the place from which he had removed. In Bull v. Klstner (1965) 257 
Iowa 968, 135 NW2d 545, the court ruled that a defendant's actions and 
intentions were Important considerations in determining what was his 
usual place of abode. Where a resident of a state leaves it, intending 
never to return, the place which he left ceases to be his usual place 
of residence, notwithstanding his wife remained behind pending later 
departure, Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bank of Maquoketa (1885) 33 Kan 100, 5 
P. 384. In Holtberg v. Bommersbach (1952) 236 Minn. 335, 52 NW2d 766, 
it was held that a person's intent not to return, if established, could 
be of extreme Importance in determining whether or not an established 
residence had been abandoned. To sum it up, I go back to the McGill 
case supra: "It must be remembered that a man has the absolute and 
unqualified right to change his place of abode when he pleases, for any 
reason which prompts him to do so, and that he does change his place of 
abode when he removes from one place, with the intention of abandoning 
It as his place of abode, to another place, where he expects to abide, 
without having the intention of returning to the place from which he 
removed.M 
It has already been clearly established that such intention 
not to return existed well before the attempted service of process in 
in this case, (Tr. 33, 36, 37, 56, 117, 157, 167), thereby rendering 
such service void as to respondents herein. 
EIGHTH ARGURMENT 
Respondents Rev. Bishop Francis K. Schuckardt, Fra. 
Mary Fidel is, and Bro. John Francis Marie had 
permanently left their "usual place of abode" prior to 
attempted service, with the intention never to return, 
and indeed, never did return; thereby rendering such 
place their "former place of abode." Substitute 
service at one's "former place of abode" has been 
clearly held to be invalid. 
Washington Rules of Civil Procedure, Title 4.28.080(14), 
provides an alternative method to personal service: 
The summons shall be served by delivering a copy 
thereof, as follows: 
(14) In all other cases, to the defendant personally, 
or by leaving a copy of the summons at the house of his 
usual abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then resident therein. 
It is under this statute that service was attempted upon 
respondents in the present case. 
In all events, the purpose behind service is to give defendants 
actual or constructive notice of a pending suit, so as not to deprive 
them of their right to due process. The purpose of leaving the 
summons at a defendant's usual place of abode is that upon defendant's 
return he will be confronted with the summons and thereby be afforded 
an opportunity to present his defense. In the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Earle v. McVeigh, (1876) 91 U.S. 503, 23 L.ed. 398, 
the court stated: 
"When the law provides that notice may be posted on the 
'front door of the party's usual place of abode,1 in 
the absence of the family, the intention evidently is 
that the person against whom the notice is directed 
should then be living or have his home in the said 
house. He may be temporarily absent at the time the 
notice is posted: but the house must be his usual place 
or abode, so that, when he returns home, the copy of 
the process posted on the front door will operate as 
notice; which is all that the law requires." 
The Supreme Court of Utah follows this line of reasoning: 
"Of course, the intent of the legislature in specifying 
that the copy be left at "the defendant's 'usual place 
of abode' was to provide for the summons to be left at 
a place where the defendant would in all probability 
get the summons and so receive personal notice of the 
pending action." Booth v. Crocket, 173 P.2d 647. 
The very error these two courts were trying to correct happened 
to respondents in this present case. The appellant caused the 
Washington summons to be left at an abode in which respondents Rev. 
Bishop Francis K. Schuckardt, Fra. Mary Fidelis, and Bro. John Francis 
Marie had permanently left and the legislative intent of giving them 
actual or constructive notice was never fulfilled, due to the fact that 
this was not their usual place of abode, (Tr. 32, 33, 41, 42, 55, 82, 
83, 157, 165, 188, 190, 191), 
This of course brings us to the threshold question; what 
constitutes, under Washington law, someone's Musual place of abode"? 
The amount of decisions on this issue are voluminous, but upon careful 
study Washington does indeed take a consistent stand. 
In Washington Practice, Vol, 14, Section 104(2), it is 
described as: 
"'usual place of abode' is a much more restricted term 
than 'residence' and means the place where the 
defendant is actually 1iving at the time the service is 
made," Dolan v. Baldridge (1931) 165 Wash. 69, 4 P.2d 
871; Wilbert v. Day (1915) 83 Wash. 390, 145 P. 446. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
This definition has been the long and steadfast rule within the 
state of Washington. In Washington Words and Phrases, under the 
heading of "usual place of abode", no definition was given except the 
listing of the following cases: 173 P.2d 650; 173 P.2d 647; 108 P. 931; 
& 73 P. 325. These cases have defined "usual place of abode" as 
follows: 
Washington Definitions of Usual Place of Abode 
The first citation, 173 P.2d 650, Gounis v. Crockett, and the 
second citation, 173 P.2d 647, Booth v. Crockett, were both decided on 
October 14, 1946, Ironically enough, by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Both cases were very similar. The court in Gounis said: "There are 
minor factual differences between Booth v. Crockett, supra, and this 
case. In the Booth case the defendant on whom service was attempted to 
be obtained enlisted in the navy; the summons was left at his parent's 
home; he was in frequent communication with his parents and was 
actually informed of the suit; and before he entered the navy he had 
had no other home except that of his parents. In this case, Broadwater 
was inducted into the army; the summons was left at the home of his 
grandmother; he lived at that home six months before entering army 
service; he was infrequently in communication with his grandmother. He 
did not actually receive notice of the suit from his grandmother." In 
both cases the Supreme Court ruled that service of process had not been 
effected. 
The Booth case bears a striking resemblence to the case at 
bar. In the Booth case, defendant Fairbanks left for the navy on Dec. 
5. On Dec. 13, just 8 days later, attempted substitute service was 
purportedly made on his mother at her home, where Fairbanks was 
residing until joining the navy. Fairbanks left some clothing and 
personal belongings there, and was informed by his father that a suit 
had been filed against him. As with all new military enlistes, 
Fairbanks had no knowledge of where his new abode would be except that 
he would reside wherever the military put him. But he did know he 
would not be living at home, at least not until his service with the 
navy terminated. 
In the case at bar, the factual issues are even more defined. 
Respondents Rev. Bishop Francis K. Schuckardt, Fra. Mary Fidells, and 
Bro. John Francis Marie all left the "Priory", not with the intention 
of possibly returning in a couple of years, but with no intention of 
ever returning. (Tr. 33, 36-7, 56, 117, 157, 167). Unlike Fairbanks, 
these respondents left no clothing or personal belongings behind, (Tr. 
36-7, 54-5, 77, 84, 107, 118, 132, 151, 152, 166), and unlike 
Fairbanks, they knew exactly where they were going at the time service 
was attempted. (Tr. 37-9, 77, 124, 132, 153, 157, 167). And unlike 
Fairbanks, they had no knowledge, outside of conflicting rumors, that 
OR 
they were being sued. (Tr, 40, 57, 58, 59, 61). 
The Booth court in defining "usual place of abode" relied 
heavily upon an earlier decision in Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 
P. 931. It said: 
"Usual place of abode is sometimes referred to as being 
synonymous with domicile or permanent residence. In 
our judgment there is a broad distinction between 
domicile and usual place of abode as the latter term is 
used in our statute." 
"The Statute does not direct service to be made, at the 
'residence' of the defendant, but at his dwelling 
house or usual place of abode, which is a much more 
restricted term. As was said in Stout v. Leonard, 37 
N.J.L. 492, many persons have several residences which 
they permanently maintain, occupying one at one period 
of the year and one at another period. Where such 
conditions exist, a summons must be served at the 
dwelling house in which the defendant is living at the 
time when service is made." (Italics in original) 
"That is, where a person abides-lives-at the particular 
time when the summons is served, constitutes his usual 
place of abode. A similar question was before the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Eacle v. McVeigh, 
91 U.S. [5031 at page 508, 23 L.ed. 398, where it held 
that, where service of summons is required to be made 
at the 'usual place of abode' such service, in order to 
constitute legal service, must be at the defendant's 
'then present residence.' In other words, at the place 
where the defendant then lives or abides." (Italics in 
original) 
"The fact that many of his (Fairbanks') personal 
possessions remained at the home and that the ties of 
blood and affection continued and that he frequently 
corresponded with persons at the home are to be 
considered in determining where he was "living," but in 
this case those facts are greatly outweighed by his 
physical departure from the place for the purpose of 
undertaking naval duty at a distant base for apparently 
an indefinite period of time. We think it clear that 
Frank Fairbanks was not 'living' at the Fairbanks home 
when the copy of the summons was left there. 
"We do not mean that when a person departs from his 
usual place of abode temporarily for business, pleasure 
or cultural purposes (as iji Ridpath - my addition) he 
has ceased living at his usual place of abode. Living 
at a place does not mean that a person must be always 
there. But if the break in the continuity of his 
activities which constitute living at what was his home 
is so marked, such as an indefinite tenure of military 
or any duty away from that home or a departure for a 
prolonged though definite term of study or where he has 
distinctly taken up a new station for business 
purposes, even though he may have his belongings at his 
former place of abode or keep on close correspondential 
touch with it, the place where he lived would be not 
his present usual place of abode but a former place of 
abode. Such a marked severance with the place at which 
he abided means that he no longer usually abides 
there. " 
The third citation quoted in Washington Words and Phrases is 
yet another Utah Supreme Court case, the above mentioned Grant v. 
Lawrence, 108 P. 931. This case has been fully quoted in the Booth and 
Gounls, supra. 
The fourth and last citation from Washington Words and Phrases, 
McFarlane v. Cornelius (1903) 43 Or. 513, 73 P. 325, the court defines 
"usual place of abode11 in the following terms: 
"The fdwelllng house1 or 'usual place of abode,1 as 
used in the statute under consideration, are synonymous 
terms, and evidently mean domicile." 
"A distinction is clearly made by these statutes 
between the defendant's domicile in this state and his 
residence," 
Thus it is clear that under Washington law, the definition of 
one's "usual place of abode" is one's "present place of abode." 
It appears that appellant attempted to leave Washington law in 
quest of some law more favorable to his position. His efforts brought 
him to federal law, 28 Fed. Proc. L.ed., Section 65:70, p. 472 (1982). 
I do not see what effect federal rulings could have in Washington since 
Washington court's have not been silent on this issue, nor was the 
purported service conducted according to federal law. But in case the 
Court feels it has any bearing to this case, I will briefly address 
this issue. 
Appellant, in quoting section 65:70 supra, (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 15), left out a very significant part of it. Section 65:70 starts 
on 
out: 
Generally speaking, a person's usual place of abode is 
the place where he is actually living, except for 
temporary absences, at the time service is made. There 
is no hard-and-fast rule, and a determination of abode 
may require a practical inquiry as to where the 
defendant is actually living, and a review of the facts 
of the particular case. (Emphasis supplied) 
In furtherance of this point, in Hannah v. United States Lines 
Co., 151 F.Supp. 122, the court defined "dwelling house or usual place 
of abode" as provided in F.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(1): 
"The language 'dwelling house or usual place of abode' 
as contained in the rule, is taken directly from former 
Equity Rule 13; the same or similar language appears in 
many statutes. The decisions interpreting the term 
indicate that no hard-and-fast definition can be laid 
down, but that what is or is not a party's 'dwelling 
house or usual place of abode' within the meaning of 
the rule or statute is a question to be determined on 
the facts of the particular case. Ordinarily, however, 
it Is held that a person's usual place of abode is the 
place where the party Is actually living, except for 
temporary absences, at the time service is made. 2 
Moore's Fed.Prac, (2d ed.) 929." (Emphasis supplied) 
Appellant quotes in part section 65:70 supra, which says: 
Factors which are considered in determining whether a 
place is a defendant's usual place of abode or not 
include the retention of a room or storage of 
possessions there, the intention to return, the use of 
that address on offical forms such as driver's 
licenses, voters registrations, the use of a telephone 
listing at that location, a failure to provide the post 
office with a forwarding address, the receipt of actual 
notice, and the defendant's ability to present at least 
some evidence that his abode is elsewhere. 
Appellant claims that only one of these factors is present in 
this case. That is simply not so. There are four factors present in 
this case at the time of service and all factors present within several 
months following purported service. At the time of purported service 
the four present factors were: 1) "the retention of a room or storage 
or possessions there"; all possessions were clearly out of the house at 
the time of attempted service, (Tr. 55, 153, 166); 2) "the intention 
to return"; there was clearly no intention of returning as the 
testimony and evidence in this case brought out, (Tr. 33, 36, 37, 56, 
117, 157, 167); 3) "the receipt of actual notice" was never had in 
this case, (Tr. 40, 57, 58, 59, 61); 4) "the defendant's ability to 
present at least some evidence that his abode is elsewhere"; this 
factor also was met as was evidenced in the district court hearing. 
(Tr. 37-39, 77, 124, 132, 153, 157, 167). 
In short, according to the generality of federal law, (if it 
even applies to this case), the Priory was not the usual place of 
abode of respondents at the time of attempted service. 
I will conclude this part by addressing the two benchmark cases 
of Washington, Ridpath and Dolan, starting with Rldpath. 
It is clear that due to the lack of any substance supporting 
appellant's contentions in this case, that they have resorted to a 
tactic of distorting the facts in an apparent hope of supplying what Is 
wanting to them. Appellant's attempt of making Ridpath a factual 
similarity to this case is an example of such distortion. The facts 
in reality are quite distinct. 
In Northwestern Y Pacific Hypotheek Bank v. Ridpath, 
("Ridpath"), 29 Wash. 687, 70 P. 139, the defendant, A.M. Cannon, left 
his home just days before the service of summons upon him. Due to his 
absence, service was effected by delivering summons to his wife at his 
"usual place of abode." (Id.) Cannon knew of the upcoming suits, 
(three actions were taken against him), "He knew before he left that 
these actions would be commenced at once." (Id. at 147). Cannon's 
departure was to take a "sea voyage for his health to South America", 
that "Cannon was thinking of taking a trip to South America for his 
health." (Id. at 146). Cannon had no intention of changing his 
residence or moving from Spokane, as was adduced from defendant's 
witness, Mr. Sanders: "[Hie (Cannon) said that he was not going away to 
locate, but was going for his health; that he was not going to leave 
permanently; that he would be back in Spokane, and that he was going to 
leave his wife in Spokane, that he expected to live and die there; that 
he was buried in Spokane; that he never said anything to him (Mr. 
Sanders) that indicated that he had any intention of changing his 
residence or place of abode ... and that he was on a trip for his 
health." (Id. at 146). Another witness for defendant, J.W. Binkley: 
"that Cannon never said anything to him on the subject of changing his 
residence or abode or domicile; that he understood that Cannon was 
taking a trip for his health." Another witness, J.R. Taylor, 
testified: "neither Cannor nor any one else ever suggested to him that 
Cannon was going away, or was thinking of changing his address, 
domicile, or abode." (Id. at 147). 
Thus it can be clearly seen, that Cannon never changed his 
abode or ever intended to. He left on a trip for his health and had 
every intention of returning. Moreover, he left his wife and all their 
possessions in Spokane, thereby giving a further indication of his 
intent to return. 
While, as appellant says, "the similarities between Rldpath and 
the present case are striking'" respondent also finds them to be 
striking i.e., in striking contrast with the facts of this case. As 
already outlined, here respondents left with no intention of returning. 
Here respondents had packed their possessions. (Tr. 36-7, 54-5, 77, 84, 
107, 118, 132, 151-2, 166). Here respondents were taking a permanent 
trip, not for their health, but for the sake of moving to another 
location. (Tr. 37-9, 77, 124, 132, 153, 157, 167). Here there is no 
indication or evidence in the least to contradict respondents1 
testimony of never intending to return to the Priory. (Tr. 33, 36-7, 
56, 117, 157, 167). On the contrary, the fact that the few remaining 
Church members at the Priory at the time of attempted service were 
concluding their packing, strongly supports this contention. (Tr. 36-
7, 54-5, 77, 84, 107, 118, 132, 151-2, 166). 
It would be well to interrupt here to distinguish another 
fallacy drawn by appellant, i.e., that the ties of a religious family 
fall into the same category as those of a family by blood or marriage. 
There were several religious houses for men besides the Priory. 
Religious were assigned to certain houses according to their 
occupation and employment not due to any affinity they shared with 
one another. Indeed, as was testified to, (Tr. 15, 16), some of the 
respondents would stay at One place or another as determined solely by 
their work assignments even within a given week. Certainly many 
jobs demand their employees to live at the job site in order to better 
fulfill their duties, and respondent contends that this scenario more 
closely resembled that situation than that of a "family" who resides 
together because of reasons of affinity. 
We now come to Dolan v. Baldridge, 4 P. 871. In this case the 
Supreme Court of Washington ruled en banc without any dissenting 
opinion regarding the decision of the court on service. The factual 
situation in Dolan draws a very close resemblence to the facts of this 
case. Defendant Baldridge's wife was in an auto accident with 
plaintiff Mrs. Dolan. On April 28, 1930, Mr. Baldridge left Spokane 
for Seattle pursuant to a command from his employer, the U.S. 
Treasury. He notified his employer of his arrival in Seattle on April 
29, and told them - "You will later be advised of my residence 
address." (Id. at 873). Mrs. Baldridge was in Seattle on May 9th 
and 10th with her husband, "engaged in selecting a permanent place of 
residence in that city. While the affidavit does not recite the 
street and house number, no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
than that they succeeded in finding a place to live, Inasmuch as on 
May 11th the wife returned to Spokane to ship the household furniture 
to the respondent's new home In Seattle." (Emphasis supplied) (Id. at 
873). On May 12th, the wife was served personally and substitute 
service attempted on her husband through her. The court concluded: 
"Clearly, the Spokane house, the former home of 
respondents, the place from which they were then 
removing their household goods, was not the house of 
their usual abode under the statute." 
"In its relation to the question 'to whether a summons 
has been left at the house of his usual abode,' the 
quoted term means one's fixed place of residence for 
time being, the place where defendant is actually 
living at the time, and may be synonymous with 
'residence.' But ordinarily 'usual place of abode' is 
a much more restricted term than 'residence' and means 
the place where the defendant is actually living at the 
time when service is made. Service at the dwelling 
house of defendant, which is not described as his usual 
place of abode, is not sufficient. The purpose of the 
use of the term in the act relating to the service of 
process has primary reference to the place where the 
defendant is usually to be found. Therefore 'usual 
place of abode' means 'present place of abode.*" 2 
Words and Phrases, Second Series, page 918. (Italics 
in original) 
"To the same effect is Mygatt v. Coe, 63 N.J.Law, 510, 
44 A. 198, 199, in which the phrase 'usual place of 
abode' is defined as the house in which the person to 
be served is actually living at the time of the 
service." 
"The husband was not, the wife was not, actually living 
at the Spokane residence at the time service was 
attempted. She was there simply removing their 
household goods to their new residence in Seattle. At 
the time substituted service upon the husband was 
attempted, 'the house of his usual abode' was in 
Seattle. There he was actually living." (Id. at 873). 
The court then concluded that the trial court did not err in 
quashing service upon defendant husband. (I wish to point out here 
some errors in appellant's brief. Appellant's brief incorrectly states 
that the supreme court reversed the ruling of the lower court, when In 
fact it sustained it. Appellant also left out of his direct quotation 
of Dolan on page 18 of his brief the italicized where the defendant is 
actually living at the time as found in the original). 
While the facts in the Dolan case are very similar, they are 
not as favorable to respondents as at the case at bar. In Dolan, 
defendant wife had been packing for just one day at the time of 
attempted substitute service on her husband. In this case, 
respondents remaining to pack had been packing for 5 days, and in fact 
were finished packing, finished their last meal, and were in the 
process of washing the dishes just before their departure for their 
new home in California when attempted service was tried. (Tr. 36-7, 
54-5, 77, 84, 107, 118, 119-23, 132, 151-2, 166). If the court found 
in Dolan that Hthe place from which they were then removing their 
household goods, was not the house of their usual abode under the 
statute," (Id. at 873), most certainly the same would apply here. 
In Dolan, the new place of abode was not found until just two 
days before attempted service. In this case, a new abode was offered 
and accepted three days before service. (Tr. 37-9, 77, 124, 132, 153, 
157, 167). Unlike Dolan, respondents in this case did not have to go 
to California "to engage in selecting a permanent place of residence 
in that city" due to their past trips there and their already knowing 
where and what they were moving into. (Id.), Indeed, defendant Fra. 
Isaac Jogues Marie had lived their for 18 years of his life. 
If In Dolan the court concluded that they found a place to 
live despite the fact that their affidavit did not cite the street and 
house number, because "no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn 
than that they succeeded in finding a place to live, inasmuch as on 
May 11th the wife returned to Spokane to ship the household furniture 
to the respondents1 new home in Seattle," (Id. at 873), no other 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn In this case either, especially 
since most of the furnishings had already been trucked out several 
days prior to attempted service, (Id.). 
As can be readily seen, the two cases are very similar, and 
contrary to appellant's brief, Dolan, not Ridpath, is the controlling 
case is this appeal, and as in Dolan, this court should sustain the 
quashing of service of the district court. 
NINTH ARGUMENT 
The burden rests on the appellant to prove that the 
trial court clearly erred in quashing the service of 
summons. 
The appellant has the burden of proof In this action, to prove 
that the trial court erred in its ruling, Anderson v. Johnson 1 Utah 2d 
400, 268 P.2d 427; Baker Lumber v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 
764; Buchanan v. Crites (Utah) 150 P.2d 100. 
Not only does appellant have the burden of proof, but his proof 
must clearly perponderate against the findings of the trial court. 
Crimmins v. Simonds, Utah, 636 P.2d 478 (1981). The standards 
appellant must meet have been set out in Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 
(Utah) : 
Quoting Nokes v. Continental Mining Y Milling Co., 6 
Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d 954: MtT]he finding of the 
trial court will not be disturbed if the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the finding; nor, if the 
evidence thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubtful 
where the preponderance lies; not, even if its weight 
Is slightly against the finding of the trial court, but 
it will be overturned and another flndLng made only if 
the evidence clearly preponderates against his finding." 
"In substance, this is the same standard applied in 
those cases which state that we reverse only when the 
trial court's finding is against the clear weight of 
the evidence. McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996 
(1978); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beraver County, 22 Utah 2d 
143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969); Metropolitan Investment Co. 
v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962); Peterson 
v. Peterson, 112 Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135 (1948)." 
"In applying this standard, we are 'mindful of the 
advantaged position of the trial judge who sees and 
hears the witness1 and therefore 'give due deference to 
his decisions,' McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d at 997, 
but we are not required to affirm where the evidence 
does not provide the requisite support for the 
findings. Ingram v. Forrer, Utah, 563 P.2d 181, 183 
(1977)." 
Appellant has failed to establish that the district court 
commlted any error in the quashing of the service of summons and 
therefore this court is urged to uphold the ruling of the district 
court and sustain the quashing of service. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus it is evident the the district court had properly weighed 
the evidence presented, and came to the only resonable conclusion it 
could have, i.e., that valid service of process was never effected upon 
respondents In this case. 
Furthermore, appellant has clearly failed to sustain his burden 
of proving that the district court commlted grevlous error in quashing 
the purported service of summons. 
Respondent therefore respectfully petitions this court to 
affirm the ruling of the district court below and sustain its ruling of 
quashing the service of summons. 
Respondent herein joins in with the pleadings of other 
respondents in this action. 
Dated : V - | 7 - V 1 
Bro . Jtohn F r a n c i s M a r i e , CMRI 
EXHIBIT "A" 
OFFICE v.. T . . - SHERIFF OF SPOKANE COUN1 , v\..SHINGTON^ 
SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE ^ 
Cause No. oH£ui445"^q^/ 
Sheriffs No. N 6381 *Vffiffc 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE J5 3* 
The Corporation of the Tr ident ine Lat in Francis Schuckardt, Michael Manqold 
RnrCalhoTTcTITnircirof Saint JosepnT'
 Vs a 7 l 7 a " T r a r ? R T I T n r H a r f e , ^abyfeT-Gorbet 
Dennis Chicoine and Tom Drahman a /k /a Bro. Isaac Jacques M a n e , et al 
I, LARRY V. ERICKSON, Sheriff In and for said County and State, do hereby ortify that I received the 
annexed A f f i d a v i t of Thomas A. Drahman & Dervrns Chicoine; Motion for Order to Show 
Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction"SfibuTcTnot~!ssue~;~0r3er~Requiring"Defen"darifs~tb" 
Appear and Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Summons and 
"Complaint for Damages and Injunct ion 
on the 8th day of ^u n e
 f 19 . ,.84 t a n ( j that I served the same on the 
8 t h
 day of J u n e 19 J L , at the hour ol 6 : 1 J P M with.n-.he 
County of Spokane, State of Washington, as follows: 
PERSONAL. By delivering to and leaving with: 
the said personally, a copy of said 
SUBSTITUTE: After diligent search and Inquiry, was unable to find Joseph Belzak 
_, I served by delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath, 
resident , personally, a person of suitable age and discretion, then resident 
therein at the house and usual abode of said Joseph Belzak, E. 2314 S. Altamont Blvd. , 
Spokane, litPr 
a copy of said A f f i d a v i t of Thomas A. Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for Order to 
Snow Cause Why a PreliminarynTnlunclion SKouTd not~Tssue; Order~Requiring Defendants 
to Appear and Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Sunmons and 
Complaint for Damages and Injunct ion ~~ 
BUSINESS, CORPORATION: On said 
By delivering to and leaving with , 
the of said 
a copy of s* M * 
GARNISHMENT: On said __ 
Garnishee Defendant by delivering to and leaving with 
a suitable person and a 
of said Garnishee Defendant at 
persopally, a copy of said Writ of Garnishment, four answer forms, three stamped, addressed 
enveiopej and $10.00 as rsauired by statute 
Dcteo j m „ § t h day of _ iune_
 19 84__ 
SHERIFF'S FEES LARRY V ERICKSON, Sheri'f 
Spokane County, Washing ton 
Mileage 
11.00 
Sery.ce - ** Q> KSllJ^^ 
TOTAL % 11'°° By * _ _ _ i _ Deputy 
JFHCEOr <t5HfcHlht-Ut-5HUKANfcUUUNnr, ,A5HINUIUN JUN X5 1984 
SHERIFFS RETURN OF SERVICETHDMASR.FALLOUIST 
Sl^tKANE COUNTY 
Cause No. C4201445-2CU** 
Sheriff'sNo. 'Kv6381 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE ) oS' 
The Corporation o f t h e T r i d e n t i n e Latin Francis Schuckardt, Michael Mangold 
RTtT"CrthoTrcnC]uirch of Sa"frit"Josepn7~ Vs a7R7aTraT PhTrTTp^te"rierGabTterGorbet 
Dennis Chicoine and Tom Drahman ' a /k /a Bro. Isaac Jacques Marie, et al 
I, LARRY V. ERICKSON, Sheriff in and for said County and State, do hereby certify that I received the 
annexed A f f i d a v i t of Thomas A. Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for Order to Show 
Cause Why a Preliminary lnounctidi"'5^uTcniot Issue; 'OraerlJequinng Defendants to 
APPlaL_and Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Summons ana 
"Complaint for Damages and Injunction 
on the ^th day of ^ u n e
 t 19 84 t a n ( j that I served the same on the 
8 t h
 day of J u n e 19 8 4
 t at the hour of 6 : 1 ° P M . within -the 
County of Spokane, State of Washington, as follows; 
PERSONAL: By delivering to and leaving with: 
the said personally, a copy of said 
SUBSTITUTE: After diligent search and inquiry, was unable to find Francis Schuckardt 
, I served by delivering to and leaving with Terry Horwath, 
resident , personally, a parson of suitable age and discretion, then resident 
»h f l r f l « a nhoh f t ne f t a nHn.„ a hhn^« i«w Francis Schuckardt, E. 2314 S. Altamont B lvd . , therein at the house and usual abode of said r • .,« , 
acopvofsaid A f f idav i t of^Thomas A, Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for Order to 
Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should hoFTssue; Order Requfrfng Defendants 
to Appear and__Sjiojw Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Summons and 
CdmpTaln~t~7or Damages and Injunction" 
BUSINESS. CORPORATION: Onsaid 
By delivering to and leaving with 
the of said 
a copy of said 
GARNISHMENT: Onsaid 
Garnishee Defendant by delivering to and leaving with 
a suitable person and a 
of said Garnishee Defendant at 
personally, a copy of said Writ of Garnishment, four answer forms, three stamped, adare^sed 
envelopes and $10.00 as required by statute. 
J un_e_
 1 g 84 
LARRY V. fc"RICKSON. Sheriff 
Spokane County, Washington 
Dated tnij 8 t h 
SHERIFF'S FEES 
Mileage 
Service 
TOTAL I 
_ day of ._ 
11.00 
11.00 bv 
C j ^ , e^SLC 
Deputy 
OFFICE ^r "r. ,c SHERIFF OF SPOKANE CCUN i i , WASHINGTON
 v J ^- J> 
SHERIFF'S RETURN OF SERVICE '\J^\S O 
Cause No -^^'fyo%f* 
Sheriffs No. , N 6 3 8 1 * V ^ W _ 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE ) M t 
The Corporation of the Tridentine Latin Francis Schuckardt, Michael Mangold 
KftTT^hbTJFTlTi^^
 vs> a7fT/r~FrirrTniiTT1p"Marre~CabrTer-Gorb-et 
Dennis Chicoine and Torn Drahman * a /k /a Bro. Isaac Jacques Marie, et al 
I, LARRY V. ERICKSON, Sheriff in and for said County and State, do hereby certify that I received the 
annexed Af f idav i t of Thomas A. Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for Order to Show 
Cause Uhy^ryfenminary Injunction SMJ73~7ioiri5s"ue; Order Requiring d&ermaKtlTW 
Apgeajr and Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Summon? and 
Complaint for Damages and Injunction 
on the _ J * £ l L - day of )h*M , 19 S4
 r a nd that I served the same on the 
8 t h
 day of J u n e __, 19 _ ! ! _ . , at the hour of 6 : 1 0 P M within -the 
County of Spokane, State of Washington, as follows: 
PERSONAL: By delivering to and leaving with: 
the said personally, a copy of said 
SUoaTITUTE: After diligent search and inquiry, was unable to find Andrew Jacobs 
.— , I served by delivering to and leaving with T o r r y Horwath, 
resident , personally, a person of suitable age and discretion, then resident 
therein at the house and usual abode of said Andrew Jacobs. E. 2314 S. Altamont B l v d . ^ 
Spokane, WA 
ampynfsaid Af f idav i t of Thomas A. Drahman & Dennis Chicoine; Motion for Oraer to 
Snow Cause Why a Preliminary 7hjunctio~h Sfio^cThot Is~sue; O^^eFTlequilTnT^erendants 
to Appear and Show Cause Why a_Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; Summons and 
Complaint tor Damages and Injunction 
BUSINESS, CORPORATION: On said 
By delivering to and leaving with , 
the __ of said 
a copy of said 
GARNISHMENT: On said 
Garnishee Defendant by delivering to and leaving with 
. a suitable person and a 
oi said Garnishee Defendant at 
personally, a copy of said Writ of Garnishment, four answer forms, tnree stamped, addressed 
envelopes and $10.00 as required by statute 
Dated thi3 ?£!l day of _ J u n g . , 19 ^ 
SHERIFF'S FEES LARRY V ERICKSON Sheriff 
Spokane County, Washington 
Mileage 
Service ^ ^ < & S ^ 
TOTAL 3 1 L Q ° B/ ^ ^ '_ ' Deputy 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SPOKANE 
NO. 
420 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 
AND INJUNCTION 
THE CORPORATION OF THE TRIDEN-
TINE LATIN RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
OF SAINT JOSEPH, DENIS CHICOINE 
and THOMAS A. DRAHMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FRANCIS SCHUCKARDT,MICHAEL 
MANGOLD a/k/a FRA.PHILLIP 
MARIE, GABRIEL GORBET a/k/a 
BRO.ISAAC JACQUES MARIE, 
VLADIMIAR BORIDIN a/k/a BRO. 
LONGIUNS, COURTNEY KRIER a/k/a 
FRA.MATTHEW MARIE, RAYMOND 
KOSCH a/k/a FRA.CLEMENT MARIE, 
JOHN WARD a/k/a BRO.MARY STAN-
ISLAUS, ANDREW JACOBS a/k/a BRO. 
MARY FIDELIS,TERRY HORWATH a/k/a 
BRO.MARY MATHIAS, JOSEPH BELZAK 
a/k/a BRO.JOHN FRANCIS MARIE, and 
FERNANDO ROJAS a/k/a BRO.JOSE 
MARIE, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, THE CORPORATION Or THE TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH, is a Washington corporation, 
whose principal location and residence is in the County of Spokane, 
State of Washington. 
II 
The plaintiff, DENIS CHICOINE, is a resident of the County 
of Spokane, State of Washington, is the Pastor and Administrator 
of the TRIDENTINE LATINE RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF SAINT JOSEPH, and 
is the sole officer and director of the plaintiff corporation. 
Ill 
The plaintiff, THOMAS A. DRAHMAN, is a resident of the County 
of Spokane, State of Washington, and is the duLy appointed and 
authorized business representative of the plaint i ft. corporation. 
IV 
All of t u e aoove-named ciol end mil : ; a r e fo rmer mcm-jcrs an:, 
r e l i g i o u s o f f i c i a l s of t l i e
 t v l t i i n t i f i c o r p o r a t i o n an., of t h e 
r e l i g i o u s d e n o m i n a t i o n , TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE CA7HOLIC CHURCH. 
ERICK80N ft ERICKSON 
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V 
All of the above-named defendants are no lonqer officials or 
representatives of the plaintiff corporation. 
VI 
The above-named defendants, acting individually and in 
agreement with TRANCIS SCHUCKARDT and under the direction of 
FRANCIS SClIUCKARDr, have taken property of the plaintiff corporatior 
without authoiity and without right and have converted saia 
property to the use ot the defendants. The value of said proDerty 
exceeds $230,000.00. 
VII 
The cierenaants are occupying and refuse to leave the plaintifr 
corpoiaMon's ?nory located at F. 2314 S. Altamont Blvd., Spokane, 
Washington. The plaintiff corporation is the owner of said 
property. 
VIII 
Defendants are threatening to gain access to the reliqious 
headquarters and place of worship of THE TRIDENTINE LATIN RITE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH at Mount St. Michaels located in Spokane County, 
Washington. Tne plaintiff corporation is the owner of Mt. Saint 
Michaels. The defendants are not authorized to be on these 
*Jreraises. 
IX 
The defendants have taken possession of personal religious 
land financial records of the plaintifl corporation ana refuse to 
return the same. 
WriLRErORE, the plaintiffs pray for judgment against and 
request that the Court grant lelief against all of the above-
named defendants jointly and severally as follous 
1. An Order that each and ever;/ defendant named herein be 
restrained fijp^  tnn premises ^o™™:>nly known ^b "iho Pr *»or\," ^ nd 
commonly described as E. 2314 S. Altamont Blvd., Spokane, 
Vjashi ngton. 
2. An Older that each and eveiy defendant nan^d heiein be 
iestraLn2d from the premises commonly known as " lv. Saint 
Michaels," located in Spokane county, State of Uasnington. 
I c o m o l a i r ERICKSON & ERICKSON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
' i a g e _ »<• r i u r INTERSTATE OK or WN BL.DC 
. NORTH « POST STREET 
SPOKANE WASHINGTON 90201 
I 
3. An Order that ine plaintiff is the owner and entitled to 
possession of the persona] reliqious records and financial records 
of tiie plaintiff corporation, and that the defendants be required 
•o^dcliver possession of tne sane to either THOM^r^K L^,tlVKfiBX5l 01 
1
 SIB FIKS7 INUBSTAU UK Or WN BLDu 
D E N I S C H I C O I N E . *°««'M * ~ ^ STKL^ 
& r o « \ M VVAS.MlNC.TOh OitZOl 
4. h ludgment aqainst each and every defendant—Te-amtly and 
bovciall^ ioi $250,000.00 and costo herein. 
r
. 'ro/^sacH^oTneT iciid? dff "^mrxoirift no^b jv&z. and 
ji oqui tabic. 
DATE J t^.o 6th do) of June, 1984. 
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Bruce H. EricKson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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BROTHER JOHN FRANCIS MARIE, CMRI 
P.O. Box 671 
Greenville, CA 95947 
(916) 284-7244 
Defendant/Respondent in pro per -d 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE CORPORATION OF THE TRIDENTINE 
LATIN RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH OF ST. 
JOSEPH, et al. 
VS. 
BISHOP FRANCIS K. SCHUCKARDT, 
et al. 
No. 880542-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of 
Respondent BROTHER JOHN FRANCIS MARIE'S Reply Brief, postage 
prepaid, this date of May 26th, 1989, to: 
John Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64101 
Robert L. Lord 
Attorney for Respondents, 
not including Brother John Francis Marie 
320 South 300 East, Suite 4A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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